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Why Do Countries
Trade? |
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International trade
occurs when countries buy products and services from each other. Countries trade for the very same reasons
as individuals that engage in market activities: to garner the
benefits of specialisation, to benefit from the effects of competition,
and to expand their range of choice. Just as it does not make sense for
every individual to try to grow all of his or her nutritional
requirements in his or her own back yard, it is not desirable for each
country to produce the entire range of goods demanded by consumers at
home. Just as individuals do better by concentrating their skills and
specialising in some activity -- working as a baker, a teacher, a
lawyer, a truck driver—and using the salaries gained from this
activity to buy food, clothing, shelter and other goods and services,
countries gain by specialising in the production of that range of goods
and services that they are best at producing or providing. By
specialising in the production of particular goods and services, firms
within a country can produce efficiently, and trade their surplus for
goods and services from other countries. Countries engage in
international trade because there are gains to be realised. These gains
take the form of greater product variety, lower prices, higher quality,
increased spread of technology and increased consumption by the country
as a whole. Increased trade openness has been linked to increased GDP
growth. Several studies have supported the assertion that more
open economies grow more and that an increase in openness
accompanies an increase in GDP/per capita.
Everyone
is affected by international trade—as consumers, as workers, and
through the impact international trade has on the country as a whole.
International trade increases the quality and abundance of consumer
goods, lowers prices and creates new jobs. Any trade liberalisation will result in winners and losers. Increased
international trade will benefit producers of exportable goods and the
workers employed in those industries, as well as consumers who are able
to purchase goods and services at lower prices. Opening to trade
will negatively affect domestic producers and workers engaged in the production of
goods that are displaced by imports, particularly those that had
previously benefited from trade protection. The challenge of
policymakers is to assist
those who lose from trade liberalisation to
adjust to the new realities, while assisting businesses and workers to
take advantage of the opportunities of international trade.
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Trade, Growth and Poverty |
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How
important is trade for poverty reduction? Can
trade liberalisation promote growth? Is
this growth pro-poor?
These questions have been widely analysed in policy and academic circles for
many decades. Twenty years ago, proponents of change and reform argued that
trade liberalisation would promote growth and thereby poverty reduction, if
accompanied by a number of other domestic reforms. As
developing countries advanced in the implementation of trade liberalising
policies, academics revisited the debate. Most agreed
that although there had been substantial trade
liberalisation in the last 20 years, growth had not been as strong as expected
in some cases. A large variety of explanations were proposed.
In a 2003 essay
titled Trade, Growth and
Poverty: A Selective Survey,
Anne Krueger and Andrew Berg conducted a selective literature review that
surveyed recent contributions to the debate and concluded that:
"Evidence from
a variety of sources... supports the view that trade openness contributes
greatly to growth. Moreover, trade openness does not have systematic effects
on the poor beyond its effect on overall growth. Trade policy is only one of
many determinants of growth and poverty reduction."
In
The LDC
Report 2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty Reduction, UNCTAD argues that
indeed
trade can play a powerful role in reducing poverty in LDCs and other
developing countries. But the report also stressed that the national and international policies
that can
facilitate this must be rooted in a "development-driven approach" to trade
rather than a "trade-driven approach" to development. A similar
approach is followed in the UNDP sponsored publication
by
Making Global Trade Work for People.
Other
researchers have tried to assess the potential impact on poverty of further
trade liberalisation at the multilateral and regional level. William
Cline presented his findings in
Trade, Growth, and Poverty Reduction.
Maurizio Bussolo,
Dominque van der Mensbrugghe, and Jann Lay,
approached the same topic from
a Hemispheric
perspective in
A Preliminary Assessment of the Economic and Poverty Impacts of the Doha and
FTAA Agenda for Latin America.
The relationship between trade, growth and poverty reduction has also been
analysed within the context of the
Caribbean. Janet Stotsky, Esther Suss, and Stephen Tokarick approach the topic at
regional level in
Trade Liberalisation in the Caribbean.
Jamaica's experience with trade liberalisation is covered by Michael
Witter in
Trade Liberalisation: The Jamaican Experience, and the
UNCTAD/UNDP's study
Jamaica: Globalisation, Liberalisation and Sustainable Human Development.
Figures on growth and poverty in the OECS countries can be found in the
2002 OECS Human
Development Report.
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What Is Trade
Policy? |
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Trade policy encompasses all the tools that
governments may use to encourage or restrict imports and exports. These
can take the form of tariffs (taxes collected on imported goods), quotas
(limitations on the quantity of goods allowed to be imported), and
voluntary export restraints (restrictions set by the exporting
government on the quantity to be sold to a foreign country).
Domestic regulations, such as mandatory health and safety standards, can
also serve as trade policy tools, if they are utilised to prevent or
encourage goods or services to be brought into the domestic economy.
Subsidies, payments by the government to encourage the production of
certain products, can be considered trade policy tools, particularly if
directed at encouraging exports.
Trade policy also includes the
approach taken in trade negotiations. In participating in the
multilateral trading system and/or negotiating bilateral trade
agreements, countries assume obligations that will become part of and
shape their national trade policies.
Throughout the twentieth century, the trade policy debate has been characterised by the opposition between
proponents of protectionist and liberal approaches. While the former
argued that a country would be better off if the government erected high
cost barriers to foreign products seeking to compete in the domestic
market in order to increase or maintain domestic production; the latter
camp countered that government intervention would lead to higher
prices for consumers, rent-seeking by domestic producers, and high
inefficiencies due to low competition - particularly in smaller economies.
Most economists agree that, given the
constraints of the political process, working towards free trade remains
the best “rule of thumb” approach to trade policy. Much research has
supported the assertion that more open economies experience a higher
rate of growth. It is recognised that open trade policy is not
sufficient to foster or sustain growth, ensure a welfare-enhancing distribution
of the benefits of growth, however, it must work
in tandem with other economic policies in order to accomplish these goals.
Throughout the latter years of
the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, most countries
in the Americas have followed trade liberalising policies. For
example, tariffs in Latin America have fallen from an average of 40
percent in the mid-1980s to about 12 percent in the mid-1990s.
Unilateral tariff reductions have been complemented by participation in
regional integration initiatives, including the establishment of free
trade agreements and customs unions and the revamping of existing
agreements, such as, for example, the revision of the CARICOM Treaty of
Chaguaramas.
For
more information
see Government Reports
to the WTO, WTO Trade Policy Reviews,
and other key trade policy documents
for:
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Dominica
Grenada
Guyana
Jamaica
Saint Kitts
and Nevis
Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Suriname
Trinidad
and Tobago
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Instruments of Trade Policy |
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Classic instruments of trade policy include tariffs and quantitative
restrictions. Trade negotiations, both at the multilateral level and through
regional and bilateral trade agreements, have traditionally focused on eliminating tariffs and
non-tariff barriers to trade. This section will explain some of these basic instruments of
trade policy and their impact.
Classic trade policy instruments include:
Trade liberalisation, through unilateral policy measures as well as through
negotiated reductions in trade distortions through the WTO and in regional free trade agreements, has diminished the importance of some of these
tools. For example, developing country tariffs are currently at an average
of about 4-5 percent, although tariff peaks -- high tariff rates (generally 15%
or more) on particular items -- still exist. Trade policy is
focusing more and more on the direct and indirect impacts of domestic
regulatory regimes on international trade and investment flows. Some of
these new policy tools are also
described below. |
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Tariffs: A tariff is a tax on imported goods.
Three main types of tariffs are:
ad valorem tariff: this is the
simplest and most frequently used tariff type, under which the rate is
expressed as a percentage of the value of the goods. For example, a tariff of
6% of the value of milk is an ad valorem tariff of 6 per cent of milk
imports.
specific tariff: a tariff that
has a fixed per-unit value—for example, $OECS 2.00 per pound. This
type of tariff is often used for agricultural goods.
variable tariff: a duty typically
fixed to bring the price of an imported commodity up to a domestic support
price for the commodity.
The effect of a tariff is to raise the price of
imported goods, thus making them generally less competitive within the market of
the importing country.
Tariffs also have the effect of raising the price
of domestically produced goods. This is due to the fact that when a tariff is
imposed, the foreign-produced good is more expensive, so consumers will buy the
domestically-produced good (assuming that the goods are the same, or
homogeneous). The extra demand for the domestically-produced good will allow
domestic producers to raise their output and prices to the market-clearing price
(the price at which consumers are willing to buy and producers are willing to
sell).
Tariffs can be used to accomplish various trade policy goals. The main goals are
- to raise revenue for the government and
- to protect a domestic import-competing
industry.
If the goal is the latter, a tariff can be set so
high that no imports will enter. This is called a "prohibitive tariff". Tariffs
can also be set much higher than needed to protect the import-competing industry. If imports would be
eliminated with a 100% tariff, but the applied tariff is set at 150%, it is said
that there is "water in the tariff" -- that is, that the tariff is set at a
level higher than is needed to inhibit trade.
The imposition or removal of a tariff has an impact on consumers, producers, the
government and the country as a whole. For a simplified analysis of the impact
of a tariff, we will look only at the importing country and assume that it is a
small country (that is, that it cannot affect the price of a good by buying or
selling that good on the world market). The supply and demand curves for the
importing country are shown in the diagram below. The diagram illustrates the
impact of imposing a tariff.
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In a free trade situation, the country is consuming QD0 units at a price of P0,
the world free-trade price (represented by the blue price line, PFT. At this price, domestic producers sell QS0 worth of
the good, and QD0 -QS0 is purchased from the other country, or imported. The
large blue bracket underneath the graph represents the amount of imports in free
trade. When a tariff of t is imposed, the price goes up by the amount of the
tariff. At the new price, P1-- the free-trade price plus the amount of the
tariff, represented in red, consumers will reduce their consumption of the good to QD1. Domestic
producers see a higher profit level, and increase their production to QS1.
Imports fall to the level represented by the red bracket, which is the
difference between QD1 and QS1.
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The
impacts of the tariff: As seen in the graph, the tariff will change the
consumption patterns on consumers and the production patterns of firms. The
overall effects of this tariff are:
Consumers: Consumers of the product in the importing
country suffer a reduction in well-being as a result of the tariff, which
increases the price of the good they previously purchased at price line P0.
The increase in the domestic price of both imported goods and the domestic
substitutes reduces the amount of consumer surplus in the market.
Consumer surplus basically means the difference between what the
consumer is willing to pay for a commodity and the amount he/she actually is
required to pay. In this case, looking at the graph, consumers lose
the entire area (a+b+c+d)
Producers: Producers in the importing country experience an increase
in well-being as a result of the tariff. The
price increase of their product on the domestic market increases producer surplus in
the industry. Producer surplus is the difference between the price
for which producers are willing and able to supply a good and the price they
actually receive. The price increase also induces an increase in the output of
existing firms --- and perhaps the addition of new firms that enter
the industry in order to take advantage of the new high profits -- , an increase in
employment in the industry, and an increase in profit and/or payments to fixed costs.
Looking at the graph, producers gain the area in which they would otherwise
not sell: the area.
Government: The government receives tariff revenue as a
result of the tariff. Who benefits from the revenue depends on how the
government spends it. Revenue from import taxes help support government
spending programs which either will benefit the general populace in the
country, as is the case with public goods, or is targeted at certain
groups. Government revenue is represented in the graph by rectangle c.
Country as a whole:
The aggregate welfare effect for the country is found by summing the gains
and losses to consumers, producers and the government:
consumer loss + producer gain +
government revenue gain
- (a+b+c+d) + a + c ---> the net effect is
-(b+d).
This
represents the loss of producer efficiency resulting from domestic firms
producing in an industry in which they are not the most efficient producers
as a result of the higher price, and the loss of consumer efficiency, as
consumers pay a higher than the free market price. The area (b+d) is
called the deadweight loss.
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Tariffs, particularly in the developed countries,
have been significantly reduced through unilateral tariff cuts, seven rounds of
tariff elimination at the multilateral level through the GATT and then the WTO,
and regional and bilateral trade agreements. While many tariffs are now
quite low, some products considered sensitive continue to have very high
tariffs. These are known as "tariff peaks".
Another phenomenon of note, one that particularly
impacts developing countries, is that of tariff escalation. Tariff
escalation occurs when a tariff on a product increases as that product moves
through the value-added chain. Low tariffs are set on primary goods with higher
tariffs on finished products. An example would be a five percent tariff on
soybeans and a ten percent tariff on soy oil. This type of a tariff structure
serves to protect domestic industry by allowing the import of basic raw
materials tariff-free or at low rates, but with higher rates of protection on
the results of value-adding processes.
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Quotas: Another
trade policy tool that can be used to manage the level of imports is an import
quota. Import quotas are limits on the quantity of goods that can be imported into a
country during a given time. In order to restrict imports, import quotas are
typically set below the free trade level of imports. This is referred to as a
binding quota; a non-binding quota is a quota that is set at or above the free
trade level of imports, thus having little effect on trade.
There are two main types of quotas: absolute quotas and tariff-rate quotas.
Absolute quotas limit the
quantity of imports to a specified level during a specified period of time.
Sometimes these quotas are set globally and thus affect all imports while
sometimes they are set only against specified countries. Absolute quotas are
generally administered on a first-come first-served basis.
Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) allow a specific quantity of a good to be imported at
a reduced tariff rate during the specified quota period. Any quantity higher
than that amount is subject to a higher tariff rate
The impact of a quota:
The welfare effects of quotas are similar to that of tariffs: if a quota is set
below free trade level, the amount of imports will be reduced. A reduction in
imports will lower the supply of the good on the domestic market and raise the
domestic price. Domestic price will rise to the level where import demand meets
the value of the quota.
Consumers - Consumers of the product in the importing country
will be worse-off as a result of the quota, as they were with the tariff. The
increase in the domestic price of both imported goods and the domestic
substitutes reduces consumer surplus in the market.
Producers - Producers in the importing country are better-off
as a result of the quota. The increase in the price of their product increases
producer surplus in the industry. The price increase also induces an increase in
output of existing firms (and perhaps the addition of new firms), an increase in
employment, and an increase in profit and/or payments to fixed costs.
The quota case differs from the tariff case, in that box C does not
automatically go to the government. It goes to the holder of the quota. The
distribution of the quota rents depends on how the quota is administered.
There are several possibilities:
1) If the government auctions the quota rights for their full price, then the
government receives the quota rents.
2) If the government gives away the quota rights then the quota rents accrue to
whomever receives these rights. Typically they would be given to someone in the
importing economy which means that the benefits would remain in the domestic
economy.
3) If the government gives the quota rights away to foreigners then people in
the foreign country receive the quota rents. In this case the rents would not be
a part of the importing country effects.
The country as a whole- The aggregate welfare
effect for the country is found by summing the gains and losses to consumers,
producers and the domestic recipients of the quota rents. The net effect
consists of two components: a negative production efficiency loss (B), and a
negative consumption efficiency loss (D). The two losses together are referred
to as "deadweight losses." The difference in the overall welfare impact of the
quota and the tariff will depend on the manner of quota administration.
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Voluntary export restraints (VERs)
A voluntary export restraint is an agreement among two governments to set a
limit on the quantity of goods that can be exported out of a country during a
specified period of time. VERs establish a type of informal quota on exports
that is enforced by the country that is voluntarily restraining their exports. VERs
may arise when the import-competing industries seek protection from a
surge of imports from particular exporting countries. VERs are then offered by
the exporter to appease the importing country and to avoid the effects of
possible trade restraints imposed by the importer.
VERs cause, as do tariffs and quotas, domestic prices to rise and cause a loss
of domestic consumer surplus. |
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Export taxes: An export tax is a
tax collected on exported goods As with tariffs, export taxes can be
set on a specific or an ad valorem basis. A tax on exports will serve
to reduce the flow of goods across the border, raising the price of
exporting a good. |
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Export subsidies
are payments made by
the government to encourage the export of specified products or services. As
with taxes, subsidies can be levied on a specific or ad valorem basis. The
most common product groups where export subsidies are applied are
agricultural and dairy products. Export subsidies on agricultural
products are often motivated by national security or self-sufficiency
considerations. A common method for applying export subsidies is the
imposition of price floors on specified commodities.
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Other Trade Policy Tools: Structural reform programs undertaken
over the past several decades have diminished the worldwide importance of
classical trade policy tools such as tariffs and quotas and led commercial
policy to focus much more on the direct and indirect impacts of domestic
regulatory regimes on international trade and investment flows. Some of
these new policy tools are as follows:
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Government Procurement Policies
Government procurement policies may have an impact on trade if they require that a specified percentage of
purchases (which could be up to 100%) by federal or state governments
must be made from domestic firms
rather than foreign firms.
Standards and Technical Regulations
A standard is defined as a “document approved by a recogni sed body, that
provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics
for products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory.” A technical regulation is a mandatory standard.
Standards and technical regulations and their associated conformity assessment
procedures are essential to protecting the life, health and well-being of the
populace and the environment. They can also be used to manage trade and
can serve as obstacles to imports from foreign countries when applied in a
manner that favours domestic products over imports.
Administrative Procedures
Another potential barrier to trade is if costly administrative procedures
are required for
the importation of foreign goods. Subjecting imports to costly and often
time-consuming procedures that do not apply to domestic goods give the
domestic import-competing good a clear advantage in the domestic market. Red-tape barriers can take many forms,
from specifying particular procedures to requiring licenses or forms from
various government bureaucracies, etc.
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Additional reading on the instruments of trade:
Elbehri, Aziz.
Welfare
Implications of Liberalising Preferential Quotas. May 2001. USDA Economic
Research Service.
Skully, David.
Liberalising
Tariff-Rate Quotas, Agricultural Policy Reform in the WTO—The Road Ahead,
May 2001. 
USDA Economic Research Service.
Auctioning
Tariff Quotas for U.S. Sugar Imports, Sugar and Sweetener Situation and
Outlook Report, May 1998.

World Trade Organisation.
Backgrounder on Agricultural Negotiations. Includes information on
tariffs, quotas, domestic support and more.

Sam Laird,
Multilateral
Approaches to Market Access Negotiations. Chapter Eight in Miguel
Rodriguez Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar, Trade Rules in the
Making, Brookings Institution/GSOAS, 1999.

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Trade Agreements |
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Trade
agreements are binding legal instruments among countries that
regulate specific aspects of their trading relations. Agreements
may be between two partners (bilateral agreements), or among
several countries (multilateral agreements). The term "multilateral
trade agreement" generally refers to the legal architecture of
the world trading system (the GATT and its successor, the WTO agreement),
which encompass nearly all countries in the world. This
framework also contains a few so-called "plurilateral"
agreements, such as the Agreement on Government Procurement, in
which not all members participate. Regional
trade agreements are those whose members belong to a particular
geographic region, such as the European Union, the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU), the Andean Community, or the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
Trade agreements are
negotiated and then signed by the parties. To be legally binding,
trade agreements, protocols and - sometimes - resolutions must be incorporated into domestic law
through each country's domestic procedures. In most countries with presidential
political regimes, the executive negotiates and signs agreements which
are then
approved by a vote in Congress.
In addition to
differing in terms of the membership, trade agreements also
differ in scope.
Partial preferential agreements
aim to liberalise trade in a limited number of goods, often reducing tariffs in
specific sectors or eliminating tariffs on an agreed-upon list of goods. Unlike
free trade agreements, the aim is not to eliminate tariffs on the entire
universe of goods. Free Trade Agreements
aim for the elimination of tariffs (although they may have
specifically-negotiated exceptions) and other barriers to trade and investment.
Custom Unions aim
for a deeper level of integration, adding the establishment of a common external
tariff (CET) to the free trade area and harmonising members' trade
policy. In other words not only are internal
tariffs removed, but countries also adopt the same tariff rates
for products originating in non-member countries. Customs
Unions, such as CARICOM and MERCOSUR negotiate external trade
agreements jointly. Common markets take integration a
further step, adding the liberalisation of the movement of
people and capital across borders. Both custom unions
and common market agreements involve a greater degree of
legislative complexity than do free trade agreements, including
some sort of Secretariat, promulgation and implementation of
common legislation
(protocols and resolutions of technical bodies) and a large
degree of policy harmonisation among parties.
Free Trade Agreements
- FTAs*
Countries in the Americas have varied in their approach to trade
integration. During the second half of the twentieth century,
the United States traditionally took a multilateralist stance,
eschewing bilateral and regional trade agreements in favour of
liberalising through the GATT/WTO. The few exceptions to
this were the 1965 Auto Pact with Canada; the 1985 US-Israel FTA
and, in the early 1990s, the Canada-US FTA and the subsequent
1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. This stance has
changed, and in the first few years of the twenty first century,
the United States
has signed free trade agreements with various trading
partners including, within the Americas, Chile, the Central
American countries and the Dominican Republic. Latin
American and Caribbean countries were early participants in
regional integration arrangements, with several customs unions
(the Andean Pact, CARICOM, the Central American Common Market)
in existence since the 1960s and early 1970s, as well as a
regional Latin American initiative towards a Latin American Free
Trade Area (LAFTA). These early trade agreements tended to
follow the principles of import substitution industrialisation (ISI),
eliminating trade barriers among the members, but erecting high
barriers to trade with the rest of the world.
In the 1980s, policies
towards trade began to change as countries unilaterally
liberalised their trade regimes. They also began to engage
in more -- and more complex-- trade liberalising agreements with
their trading partners. The LAFTA evolved into the Latin
American Integration Association, or ALADI, an umbrella framework
for conducting trade agreements among members. These ALADI economic
complementation agreements (Acuerdos de Complementación
Económica), which differ dramatically from the traditional
protectionist trade agreements of the 1960s and 1970s, are often comprehensive free trade agreements.
A new customs union, the MERCOSUR, was formed in 1995, and
already existing customs unions reformed their approach:
in 1997 the Andean Pact evolved into the Andean Community and
the CARICOM underwent a rejuvenation with the revised treaty of
Chaguaramas.
Starting in the early
1990s, Latin American countries signed a record number of
trade agreements, most of the free trade agreements that
complemented their unilateral trade opening measures by creating
legal obligations to eliminate tariffs vis-à-vis their trading
partners. Up to the late
1980s, free trade agreements aimed mostly at the elimination of
tariffs and other at-the-border measures. One example of
an early FTAs is the US-Israel FTA
which contains a short main body, the tariff schedules of each
country, and a side declaration on trade in services. With
the completion of the Uruguay Round and the launching of a much
more comprehensive multilateral trade agreement, and as
countries in the Americas began to adopt trade liberalisation as
part of their economic development strategy, the scope of trade
agreements became more far-reaching. The Canada-US FTA
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
revolutionised the scope of free trade agreements, including, in
addition to the
market access component, provisions that cover trade in
services, regulate trade
remedies, and cover traditional "domestic policy areas"
such as investment, intellectual property rights, government
procurement, labour, and the environment. Recent free trade
agreements, such as the US-Dominican
Republic-Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), for example, sometimes
even include
language on corruption, transparency and gender issues.
In a further step
towards hemispheric trade liberalisation, thirty-four countries
in the Americas undertook, at the Summit of the Americas in
1994, steps to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA). The FTAA would aim to eliminate barriers to
trade and investment within the Americas.
More information:
SICE's database of trade agreements.
List and text of all trade agreements involving countries in the Western
Hemisphere.
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Preferential Schemes
(This section draws
extensively on UNCTAD's Website section: "About
GSP" available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2309&lang=1)
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Unilateral Preferential Schemes provide selected products
originating in developing countries reduced or zero tariff rates
over the Most Favoured Nation rates. Oftentimes, the least developed
countries (LDCs) receive even wider coverage of products and deeper
tariff cuts.
The origin requirement ensures that only the goods produced in a
beneficiary country benefit from the preferences, and not ones that
have undergone minimal industrial processing.
Preferential
schemes enjoy extensive
product coverage which includes most agricultural and industrial
exports but a few and often notable exceptions remain. Preferential
schemes are renewed periodically. It is often the case that at each
revision, the preferential margins, product coverage and related
features have been improved by the preference-giving countries.
However, the existence of a renewal requirement introduces an
element of uncertainty that might affect investment decisions.
The idea of granting developing countries preferential tariff rates
in the markets of industrialised countries was originally presented
by then-Secretary General Raúl Prebisch at the first UNCTAD conference in 1964. His
argument was that
trade on a Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) basis ignored unequal economic realities among trading
nations.
Differences in terms of stages of development, factor endowments,
size of markets, efficiency and diversification of production
structures between developing and developed ones called for policies
to address those imbalances.
Thus a number of unilateral preferential schemes were granted with the objective of increasing export earnings,
promoting industrialisation; and accelerating rates of economic
growth of the recipient economies.
The
beneficiaries of non-reciprocal preferential schemes have to meet
certain requirements in order to be designated as such and
to maintain beneficiary status. Eligibility criteria differ
among the different schemes.
Adopted at the second UNCTAD Conference
in New Delhi in 1968, the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) is an umbrella that comprises the bulk of
preferential schemes granted by industrialised nations. In 2004
there were 16 national GSP schemes notified to the UNCTAD
secretariat (these GSP schemes are granted by Australia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Community,
Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation,
the Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of
America). Though the GSP is a generalised, non-reciprocal system
of preferences, it nonetheless allows special measures in favour of
the least advanced among the developing countries. Thus, countries
may grant MFN tariff rates to GATT
Contracting Parties, GSP tariffs to a given group of developing
countries, and a special GSP (SGSP) tariff to less developed
countries. The tariff equation in mathematical terms would thus be: MFNt > GSPt > SGSPt
Developing countries have also benefited from a number of other
non-reciprocal trade preference by developed countries on a
unilateral or regional basis. Such preferential trading schemes
include the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
CARIBCAN, and the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA) in the Western Hemisphere;
SPARTECA in Oceania; and the cross-regional Lomé Convention. These
schemes, like the GSP, have as their primary objective the promotion
of economic development in the beneficiary countries by means of
improved trade performance. However other objectives are expressly
pursued. For example the ATPDEA, aims to assist the Andean countries
develop alternative sources of income and livelihood to drug
production and trafficking.
The granting of preferential trade
treatment
has been accommodated in the context of the
World Trading System. In 1971, the GATT Contracting Parties
approved a temporary waiver to
Article I of the Agreement
authorising the GSP scheme. Later, in 1979, the Contracting Parties
decided to adopt the document entitled "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries"- also known as the "Enabling Clause"- creating a permanent waiver to the most-favoured-nation
obligation and allowing preference-giving countries to grant preferential
tariff treatment to developing countries under their respective GSP schemes.
The impact of
preferential schemes on trade and welfare have has been a topic of
debate. Some experts point that preferential schemes have trade
diversion effects and often lead developing countries to depend on
them for ensuring competitiveness. Nonetheless, impact studies also
show concrete benefits for the recipient economies. In fact, a
recent UNCTAD study concludes that "despite the general decline in
most-favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs as a result of GATT/WTO
negotiations, there remain substantial MFN tariffs on many
developing country exports, and preferences continue to have value
in increasing export opportunities for developing countries."
The 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration started to refocus the
attention of the trading community on the idea of unilateral
preferences by launching the idea of special trade preferences for
LDCs, including provisions for taking positive measures, for example
duty-free access on an autonomous basis, aimed at improving the
opportunities offered by the trading system for those countries. In
response to the Singapore proposal, a number of initiatives were
undertaken to provide more favourable market access conditions for
LDCs:
The Everything But
Arms (EBA) initiative entered into effect on 5 March 2001, providing
duty-free and quota-free market access to all products excluding arms,
and also excluding bananas, sugar and rice, for which customs duties
will be phased out over a transitional period and subject to tariff
quotas.
In May 2000, the United States promulgated the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), whereby the United States GSP scheme was amended
in favour of designated sub-Saharan African countries to expand the
range of products, including textiles and clothing.
In September 2000, the Canadian Government enlarged the product
coverage of its GSP scheme to allow 570 products originating in LDCs to
enter its market duty-free. In January 2003, the scheme was greatly
improved by expanding product coverage to all products, including
textiles and clothing, and new rules of origin with some minor exclusion
of selected agricultural products.
Following a review of the GSP scheme of Japan, conducted in December
2000, the scheme was revised to provide duty-free treatment for an
additional list of industrial products originating in LDC beneficiaries.
Following a second review in April 2003, an additional list of
agricultural products was added for LDCs and duty-free access was
granted for all products covered by the scheme for LDCs.
More information: - On the GSP
- On CBI and ATPDEA
- On
Cotonou - On
CARIBCAN - On impact of preferential schemes on recipient countries visit the
impact studies section.
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Bilateral
Investment Treaties
(Information extracted entirely from the
ICSID Website
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm) |
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The first modern
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) was entered into nearly forty years ago
between Germany and Pakistan. Over the decades that followed, an
increasing number of European countries concluded such treaties with
developing countries. It is, however, only since the late 1980s that BITs have come to be universally accepted instruments for the
promotion and legal protection of foreign investments.
Of the over 1,100
treaties listed on the ICSID website, more than 800
have been concluded since 1987, by a growing number of countries.
The rapid growth in the number of treaties witnessed to date appears
to continue. Most countries that have an established BIT program
continue to pursue opportunities to enter into new treaties. In
addition, a number of countries that have hitherto refrained from
concluding BITs have in recent years begun to negotiate and sign
such treaties. It may also be recalled that over the last ten years
several multilateral agreements with provisions on investment have
also been concluded. 1
Modern BITs have
retained broad uniformity in their provisions. In addition to
determining the scope of application of the treaty, that is, the
investments and investors covered by it, virtually all bilateral
investment treaties cover four substantive areas: admission,
treatment, expropriation and the settlement of disputes. Almost all
modern BITs include provisions dealing with disputes between one of
the parties and investors having the nationality of the other party.
In this respect most provide for arbitration under the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals
of Other States (the ICSID Convention) which entered into force in
1966.2
ICSID has since
the early 1970s collected the texts of bilateral investment
treaties. Most of these have been included in a multivolume
collection of Investment Treaties published by the Centre. Lists of
bilateral investment treaties were published in 1989 and 1992 in the ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal. The Centre also
published in 1995 a book on Bilateral Investment Treaties.3
More
Information:
-Listing
of Bilateral Investment Treaties for each country in the Americas
1 These include the North American Fee Trade Agreement,
reprinted in 32 ILM 289 (1993); the Colonia Protocol on the
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments within Mercosur,
signed on January 17, 1994 and the Buenos Aires Protocol on the
Promotion and Protection of Investments Made by Countries That are
not Parties to Mercosur, signed on August 8, 1994 (both protocols
concluded under the Asunción Treaty Establishing a Common Market
Between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay (Mercosur), signed
on March 26, 1991); the Treaty on Free Trade Between Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela, signed on June 13, 1994; and the Energy
Charter Treaty, reprinted in 34 ILM 381 (1995).
2
The large number of consents given in this manner (in over 900
treaties) has been reflected in ICSID's caseload. Over half of the
cases pending before ICSID at present (including two conducted under
its Additional Facility Rules) have been initiated in reliance on
consents given in treaty provision. For a list of cases submitted to
the Centre, see ICSID Cases, Doc. ICSID/16/Rev. 5. For a list of
other ICSID publications, see infra, at 104.
3 Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral
Investment Treaties (1995). |
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Regionalism |
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Regionalism
is defined by the WTO as “actions by governments to
liberalise or facilitate trade on a regional basis, sometimes
through free trade areas or customs unions.” This broad definition
encompasses a number of trade liberalisation initiatives that differ
in scope and objective. The following is
a list of "ideal types" by increasing order of market integration:
Preferential Trade Area (PTA):
While the term "preferential" strictly speaking
applies to all types of trade agreements -- as members give
preference to other members -- these PTAs refer to
agreements that entail a partial reduction in trade barriers
among member countries. This could include a reduction across
the board or full elimination in particular sectors.
Free Trade
Area (FTA):
Entails a complete elimination of trade barriers among
member countries.
Custom
Unions:
FTA plus establishment of common external tariff among member
countries.
Common
Market: Customs union plus free movement of capital and
labour and
adoption of common standards among member countries.
Economic
Union:
Single Market plus common currency and deeper policy
coordination among member countries.
In practice, the
categorisation of integration initiatives tends to be a complex
endeavor, as initiatives often include elements of
more than one category. For example,
MERCOSUR is neither a perfect
free trade area nor a complete customs union, but has elements of
both; the
Andean Community is not a full
free trade area - as Peru has not
yet fully eliminated tariffs against other members - yet it has
elements of additional integration in that policy harmonisation is
quite advanced.
The CACM has achieved a free trade
area but it is not yet a full customs union.
CARICOM has proposed an agenda
to work towards the establishment of a Single Market, yet it still
lacks many key elements typical of customs unions and there remain
disputes over the application of taxes to products originating within
the region. The OECS countries
have made substantial progress in their economic union without, for
many years, equal progress in the coordination of trade policy.
Another element that complicates the
analysis of regionalism is that with the rising number of regional
integration agreements many countries are now members of several
initiatives at the same time. Just to cite an example in the
Americas, Colombia is a member of the Andean Community, but also has
free trade agreements with Mexico
and Venezuela (in the form of the Group of Three. Colombia also is a party to several
partial preferential agreements, including an agreement on
trade, economic and technical cooperation with CARICOM.
Another country with a large network of trade agreements, in this
case FTAs, is Mexico, which is a member of
NAFTA and
ALADI, and has concluded FTAs
with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, EFTA, EU, Israel, Nicaragua, Northern
Triangle, Japan, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Most of these
agreement involve different sets of rules and regulations in terms
of Antidumping,
Competition Policy,
Dispute Settlement,
Intellectual Property Rights,
Investment,
Technical Barriers to Trade, and other
trade disciplines. The increasing regulatory complexity of trade
relations where one set of rules applies for each bilateral or
regional initiative has worried many experts, one has made the
analogy to a "spaghetti bowl". These experts often call for a
simplification of the trading system by focusing on progress at
multilateral level.
Thus, much of the debate on regionalism has centered on the
interaction of regionalism and multilateralism- where
multilateralism is understood as liberalisation among all WTO
Members. Normally, setting up a customs union or free trade area
would violate the WTO’s
principle of equal treatment for all trading partners, since
partners grant to each other preferential treatment which excludes
other countries. But
GATT’s Article 24 allows regional trading arrangements to be set
up as a special exception, provided certain strict criteria are met.
In particular, the arrangements should help trade flow more freely
among the countries in the group without barriers being raised on
trade with the outside world, and this should be done within a
reasonable amount of time. In other words, regional integration
should complement the multilateral trading system and not threaten
it. There is an extensive literature on whether regionalism and
multilateralism are friends or foes. Many specialists, and the WTO
itself, conclude that it is hard to come up with a definitive answer
to this question and that it has to be analysed case by case.
Two tendencies are worth
noting: Regional arrangements are on the rise and the character of
regional integration is also changing. In the Western Hemisphere, different
developmental paradigms have established their own approach to
regionalism. Regionalism flourished in the days of the import
substitution industrialisation (ISI) paradigm of the1950s and 1960s,
when countries embraced regionalism as a natural response to escape
the crippling effects of production for small-scale domestic
markets. Under "old regionalism" partners aimed to apply high
tariffs to third parties while eliminating internal barriers to
trade. The objective was to develop markets for nascent
industries. More recently, most Latin American and Caribbean countries have
abandoned the prescriptions of ISI and have chosen instead to actively engage in
the world economy. Experts began sketching a new vision of
regionalism. The "new regionalism" paradigm no longer views the
pooling of domestic markets as an end in itself. It rather sees it
as an asset to increase the attraction of foreign investment as well
as the bargaining power in regional and multilateral negotiations.
Thus, new regionalism is based on fostering efficiency and
competition by lowering the level of external tariffs to allow for an active
engagement in the world economy, while aiming to reap the benefits of
achieving "deep" integration (integration that goes beyond
multilateral commitments) and fostering better relations among
partners.
Multilateralists often point out that basic economics maintains
that lowering tariff barriers on a discriminatory basis causes
distortions in the home economy and that it imposes costs on third parties
that do not participate in the regional agreement. They argue that
though it is difficult to accurately evaluate the benefits of PTAs, economic
theory suggests that the net benefits of regionalism are not very large.
Finally, they maintain that regionalism diminishes the incentives to
participate in multilateral trade negotiations and might lead to a
divided world where trade conflicts among regions will increase.
Regionalists point out
that the days in which regionalism meant ISI and high tariffs are
gone,
and that "new regionalism" tends to minimise trade diversion.
Moreover, they stress that "deep" regional integration arrangements
can bring benefits to the participating countries that extend beyond
those that they might reap by sole participation the WTO. Also, they
clarify that regionalism can be a platform for improving the
insertion in the world economy.
Speeches:
Address to Trade Forum of Jamaica.
Rt. Hon. Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados
Articles:
The FTAA and
Development Strategies in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Salazar-Xirinachs, José M. (rev. April 2004).
Proliferation of Sub-Regional
Trade Agreements in the Americas: An Assessment of Key Analytical and Policy
Issues.

Salazar-Xirinachs, José M. (October 2002)
The Caribbean Community: Facing the Challenges of Regional and Global
Integration.
Jessen, Anneke and Ennio Rodriguez.
(1999)
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